

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ALEXANDER MOSKOVITS,

Plaintiff,

-against-

BANK OF AMERICA N.A.; SCHOEMAN
UPDIKE KAUFMAN & BERGER, LLP;
BETH KAUFMAN; SILVIA LARIZZA;
CALVIN GRIGSBY; ROGER BERNSTEIN;
BARRY OSTRAGER; DOES 1 – 10,

Defendants.

20-CV-10537 (LLS)

ORDER

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff filed this action *pro se*. On March 12, 2021, after granting Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, the Court dismissed this action for failure to state a claim and on immunity grounds. On March 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion and a corrected motion “for summary judgment as to ministerial act by Judge Ostrager ‘directed’ by ‘court administration’”; and a “motion for order allowing service of the summons and verified amended complaint through email.” (ECF 32-34.) On March 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) “and/or” Rule 60(b) “as to ministerial act by Judge Ostrager ‘directed’ by ‘court administration.’” (ECF 39.)

The Court liberally construes these submissions as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend judgment and a motion under Local Civil Rule 6.3 for reconsideration, and, in the alternative, as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from a judgment or order. *See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006); *see also Tracy v. Freshwater*, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (The solicitude afforded to *pro se* litigants takes a variety of forms, including liberal construction of papers, “relaxation of the limitations on the

amendment of pleadings,” leniency in the enforcement of other procedural rules, and “deliberate, continuing efforts to ensure that a *pro se* litigant understands what is required of him”) (citations omitted). After reviewing the arguments in Plaintiff’s submission, the Court denies the motion.

DISCUSSION

The standards governing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 are the same.

R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The movant must demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it. *Id.* at 509 (discussion in the context of both Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)); *see Padilla v. Maersk Line, Ltd.*, 636 F. Supp. 2d 256, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Such motions must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly considered by the court.” *Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp.*, 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); *see also SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc.*, 642 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A motion for reconsideration is not an invitation to parties to ‘treat the court’s initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may then use such a motion to advance new theories or adduce new evidence in response to the court’s ruling.’”) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

There are no facts in Plaintiff’s submissions demonstrating that the Court overlooked any controlling decisions or factual matters with respect to the dismissed action. Plaintiff’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 is therefore denied.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), a party may seek relief from a district court’s order or judgment for the following reasons:

- (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason justifying relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

The Court has considered Plaintiff's arguments, and even under a liberal interpretation of his motion, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the grounds listed in the first five clauses of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) apply. Therefore, the motion under any of these clauses is denied.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), the motion is also denied. “[A] Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be based upon some reason other than those stated in clauses (1)-(5).” *United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien*, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting *Smith v. Sec'y of HHS*, 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th Cir. 1985)). A party moving under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot circumvent the one-year limitation applicable to claims under clauses (1)-(3) by invoking the residual clause (6) of Rule 60(b). *Id.* A Rule 60(b)(6) motion must show both that the motion was filed within a “reasonable time” and that “extraordinary circumstances” [exist] to warrant relief.” *Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Pac. Fin. Servs. of America, Inc.*, 301 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). See *Ackermann v. United States*, 340 U.S. 193, 199-202 (1950).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (ECF doc. #39) is denied. All other outstanding motions are denied as moot, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate them. (ECF 32-34.)

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

Plaintiff's case in this Court under Docket Number 20-CV-10537 is closed. The Court will only accept for filing documents that are directed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 5, 2021
New York, New York

Louis L. Stanton
Louis L. Stanton
U.S.D.J.